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Abstract
Expanding the learner's capacity for inquiry and reflective thinking is one of the
most important tasks of modern education. Thinking reflectively about our own thoughts
and practices, about education of children and adults and their personal development, has
led us to believe in the value of guided reflective inquiry as an educational method.
Current definitions of reflection in education assume that the concept itself has a solid
base and its dynamic efficiency is self-evident.
By disclosing major definitions of reflection in different philosophical systems,
i.e., J. Locke, I. Kant, J.G. Fichte, G.F. Hegel, E. Husserl, E. Cassirer, it is apparent that
reflection reveals the boundaries of knowledge, anything beyond the limits of the subject
and its conditions. Searching for the roots of reflection’s problem means hoping to find
epistemic justification for it. Such justification may be reached by finding the epistemic
foundation of critical reflection. Reflective thinking should transform into a critical
strategy and later into a tool of interpretation of reality.

_____________

We are all familiar with that ubiquitous retort favored by children: “Who says?!”
We confront it in every process of education. Anything I say can be challenged by “Who
says?!” If I want to win at this game I must find an efficacious authority, the last and
affirmative one. I will “win” as long as I can come up with authority for whatever it was
that I last said. Am I allowed any say in substantiating the truth of my own statements, or
is this against the rules of the game?
As soon as I am reduced to answering “Because I say so” I know for sure I have
lost the battle, for this is a mere affirmation of myself and not a response anchored in a
legitimate authority. If I analyze my need for an “absolute authority,” then I must find a
certain method to help me assert my truths and beliefs. Every analysis needs a method,
which seemingly requires a fixed point of origin. It is the need to clarify and ascertain
everything from the beginning that obliges us to look for a certain authority or solid base.
Searching for such an authority for the “truth” may be expressed by recourse to “metalanguage,” “meta-power” or “meta-Being.” Carrying out research in order to find
“something” that lies outside the normal application of reasoning means that we hope to
construct a certain method or tool, one that will help us to fulfill our need for truth and
certainty.
Published by OpenRiver, 2003
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In the game “Who says?!” the child compels the teacher to search for the certainty
of an epistemological system, which need not be grounded on any authority but rather on
his self-knowledge, reached through critical reflection. It is the teacher’s duty to reflect
on his own “say” as well as to guide the child toward such a process. While it is quite
impossible to reflect upon each and every belief we possess or statement we make,
clearly such an epistemic accounting should be a methodological obligation – to seek
sufficient evidence for the beliefs underlying our definitions and examinations. Teachers
have a duty to reflect critically upon the evidence that they have for important beliefs
when confronted by counter-evidence or when they have no evidence at all. Critical
reflection precludes beliefs that are either ungrounded or contrary to the evidence.
Searching for the root of this “game” means hoping to find epistemic justification for it
(Metschl, 1989). Such justification may be reached by finding the epistemic foundation
of critical reflection. Understanding the nature of reflection in epistemology as well as its
practical application in the fields of education and teaching remains a vague process.
Introducing the concept of reflection into teacher education programs exposes its
problematic ground. Current definitions of reflection in education, such as Bengtsson
(1995), differentiate between the definition of reflection as self-reflection and the
definition of reflection as thinking - assuming that the concept itself has a solid base and
its dynamic efficiency is self-evident. Through reflection “man discovers him/herself as a
person, his or her mental activities, but also the existential aspects of his or her life”
(Bengtsson, 1995, p. 27). Using phenomenological intentionality, Bengtsson exposed the
process, which the teacher should go through, from his original position, creating a
certain “distance” from reality and then gaining some knowledge about something.
Reflection “is subjected to thorough consideration, that thought dwells a longer period of
time on an object to get a better and deeper understanding of it”(Bengtsson, 1995, p. 27).
Expanding the learner's capacity for inquiry and reflective thinking is one of the
most important tasks of modern education. “The important thing in the history of modern
knowing is the reinforcement of these active doings by means of instruments … devised
for the purposes of disclosing relations not otherwise apparent” (Dewey, 1988, p. 70).
Thinking reflectively about our own thoughts and practices, about education of children
and adults and their personal development, has led us to believe in the value of guided
reflective inquiry as an educational method.
Some definitions of “reflective teaching” and “reflective supervision” refer to the
basic tool of reflection, used by intentional phenomenology, for “helping them [the
children] to build on what they already know, helping them discover what they already
know but cannot say, helping them coordinate their spontaneous knowing-in-action with
the privileged knowledge of the school” (Schön, 1988). Describing and demonstrating
reflective teaching focuses on educational practice and involvement. It should lead to
“reflection-in-action,” which is a practical tool for every domain of educational life:
teaching, coaching, school bureaucracy, parents’ groups, academic researchers, etc., and
at a “higher” stage it should evolve into “reflection-on-action,” i.e., reflecting on our own
deeds and thoughts, as a stage after “reflection-in-action.”
The game of “Who says?!” engenders skeptical implications that should be
addressed and solved by exposing the core structure of reflection and examining the
consequences of implementation. “Who says that I will get a solid base to my knowledge
through reflection?” “Who says that my knowledge will find its way to my experience
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and then to my understanding of reality through different reflective processes?” “Who
says that critical reflection could be used as an effective tool by everybody?”
Reflection is not a physical act (i.e., reflection in a mirror or even a Hall of
Mirrors), nor is it “thinking hard or deep about something”; it is not just a subjective
introspection, nor is it directed only towards natural individuals (Reuter, 1989). In the
optical context, to reflect means light breaks at something and after that radiates back
from that point or plane, i.e., shows itself in a reflection of something (Heidegger, 1988,
p. 159).
After disclosing some definitions of reflection, it is reasonable to ask what shows
itself through reflection? Searching for the subject of reflection begs further questions –
Is there any similarity between optical reflection and mental reflection? Can knowledge
“see” or “have knowledge of itself”? If so, then any such knowledge would certainly
seem to be different from knowledge of “other things,” which raises questions about the
bearer of knowledge and his original conductor of the reflection: The Subject.
Reflection reveals the boundaries of knowledge, anything beyond the limits of the
subject and its conditions. Although reflection requires proceeding in accordance with an
authentic recognition of the resources and powers that are genuinely available
transcendent to it, it is hard to provide a solid base and justification for these demands,
required by human knowledge. The subject cannot avoid its own questions and
“illegitimately” demands to transcend its own limits in its search for resources and
powers.
Reflection cannot recapitulate subjectivity or recover the sense of subjectivity of
language in which reflection names the being of the self. Yet, reflective acts themselves
challenge subjectivity and its reality. Every act leads toward transgression of the subject’s
proper limits of its possibility and legitimate jurisdiction. The ultimate foundation of the
subject could be revealed through the reflection’s acts, upon which genuine knowledge,
truth, rationality, morality, and objective reality can be secured. Revealing the basic
foundations of knowledge through the application of reflection can lead to the answer to
the question, “Who says?!” The path of our reflections will take us through the process of
reflection from certain individual problems to general or basic problems of knowledge.
Through reflection, individuals may develop universal experience and knowledge, as well
as achieving what they are supposed or want to be.
Searching for the source of human ideas, John Locke’s answer was that ideas
come from experience. Locke attempted to reduce all ideas to simple elements of
experience, but he distinguished between sensation and reflection as sources of
experience, sensation providing the material for knowledge of the external world, and
reflection on material for knowledge of the mind. So, experience itself takes two forms:
“sensation,” which is an observation of externally sensible objects, and “reflection,”
which is internal observation of the operations of one’s own mind (Locke, 1975, II, I, pp.
2-8). Beginning with private data and reflection, we work outwards to knowledge of
external and internal realities. Focusing on reflection, Locke defined it as an introspective
awareness of the activities of the mind as it busies itself with the ideas it contains:
comparing, remembering, repeating, uniting, believing, etc. There are also simple ideas
of reflection, which are ideas of the mind’s operations upon its other ideas (Locke, 1975,
II, VI, p. 1). Our mind has no other object than its ideas, and therefore knowledge can be
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nothing but “the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnancy of any of our Ideas” (Locke, 1975, IV. ii. p. 2). Locke noticed that the limit
of human knowledge is designated by its own ideas. No one can extend his own ideas.
Reflection is concerned with the inner constitution and the nature of things, so that its
limits are designated by the ignorance that arises from lack of ideas.
For Locke’s empiricist theory, the idea of an authoritative source in experience is
crucial. Everything should base its fundament on experience. Therefore, beliefs formed
by experience, through reflection which is internal observation or sensation as external
observation, have an authority or validity which they would lack if they were derived
from other sources, such as dreams, fantasies, hearsay, visions or teachings of one or
another dogma.
Reflection, in its various forms of exposition, plays a major role in Kant’s
philosophical thought, either as a methodological tool or as structure. The subject of
Kantian thought is the enlightened, autonomous individual, who chooses and sets goals
for himself and develops appropriate means to those ends. It is Kant’s idea that only the
autonomous individual, who freely searches and investigates the entire world in and
around himself, must find his anchor inside himself, without appealing to external
authorities (whether they be human or divine). Autonomy is not inherent from birth:
human beings are free from birth, but not autonomous. It is the duty of every human
being who lives freely, by subjecting himself to laws of his own creation, to find out
through reflective activity that his values and dignity lie in his innate capacity for
freedom of thought and action.
Reflective acts lead every human being towards being a reflective subject, where
telos and his highest achievement, according to Kant, is autonomy. Every human being
exists as an end in himself and in any case is not a means for anybody, anything or any
idea. “Now I maintain that man and every rational being in general exists as an end in
himself, not merely as a means to be used arbitrarily by this or that will; instead in all his
actions, whether they are addressed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always
be considered at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1949, p. 203). Kant maintained that
every subject is always free in the sense that our actions are not causally determined by
the world around us, i.e., the subject has a free will. Having a free will or being free does
not mean that the subject is by definition autonomous; quite the opposite: the subject
possesses a basic dual structure, which Kant called it “heteronomy.”
Kant used a didactic method to illustrate his ideas about free will, reflective
thinking and reaching autonomy. Similar to child, who possesses free will but still is not
mature, he is not a fully autonomous person, the subject needs to be guided towards
autonomy, to be taught, which kind of acts he should undertake and how he should know
when he has reached the desired status of “autonomous being.” Normally, parents direct
and assist the child towards these goals. The child will remain immature or undeveloped
if he does not achieve maturity, i.e., autonomy. Kant exposed his own point of view about
autonomy in his famous essay entitled “An Answer to the Question: What is
Enlightenment?”(1784), (Kant, 1959), which was a part of a long debate about this issue
in his time. It was Kant’s idea that enlightenment should lead every human being towards
autonomy. To remain “childish” or in a “childish condition” means a dependent,
immature and unreflecting subject, the opposite of how an enlightened subject should
be:“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is
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the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity
is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and
courage to use it without further guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [Dare to know!]
‘Have courage to use your own understanding!’ — that is the motto of enlightenment”
(Kant, 1959, p. 41).
Kant suggested that although the content of experience must be discovered
through experience itself, the mind imposes form and order on all its experiences, and
this form and order can be discovered a priori, that is, by reflection alone. Kant’s
dichotomy – between our conceptually constructed, already elaborated world
(“objectivity”), and the contingency from which concepts extract it (“subjectivity”) –
underlies his definition of reflection. In that sense “to reflect” is to describe a state of
mind, a notion, a process, so that reflection is a metaphysical entity. Metaphysical
reflection is a methodological analysis of human knowledge: it is the mental process of
discovering and structuring our subjective conditions, which help us to affirm our
concepts. “Reflection (reflexio) does not concern itself with objects themselves with a
view to deriving concepts from them directly, but is that state of mind in which we first
set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to
arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our
different sources of knowledge; and only by way of such consciousness can the relation
of the sources of knowledge to one another be rightly determined” (Kant, 1973, B- 316).
Reflection does not include any obvious reference to real experience; it reveals our
concepts in a totally a priori way. We know how the world is and must be by a priori
reflection, which is a tool of our pure reason, and not by any reference to experience.
Metaphysical reflection asserts a firm foundation to our knowledge, which assumes that
reason is sufficient in itself to produce not only subjective knowledge, but objective
knowledge as well.
Metaphysical reflection shakes our conceptual shackles, but never revolts against
rational restraint in general, only against specific categorial confinements. It affirms that
each individual subject has privileged access to his own mental phenomena as well as
constituting its individual concepts. Yet, metaphysical reflection rejects any routine or
traditional way of thinking about the world, while it seeks after new, better or at least
different alternatives to the given reality and its concepts. The normal reflective process,
which begins as an individual vision or tendency, ends up as a commonly accepted
worldview, grounded on something fundamental, which is the structure of our
subjectivity. Metaphysical reflection ensures the concept of individuality that points
beyond mere singularity, to the intersubjectivity, which the subject is, and wants to be.
Metaphysical reflection as a methodological analysis of human knowledge also
searches for the sources of knowledge. One major way to achieve such methodological
analysis is by using certain procedures known as “regression.” Methodological regression
exposes clearly that what I “know” in concrete terms is no more “myself” than my
thoughts, my deeds or my pen and every act I have performed with them. I may know the
contents of my mind, the various storage vessels and boundaries I employ to order my
consciousness, but I cannot know what it is that contains and delineates it as a whole. I
know what is “in” my mind, even making an inventory of it, but I never “exhaust” my
mind, because there is always the last, unconditioned step that at that very moment
enables me to survey the conditioned remainder. So, if we talk about something that is
by definition “unconditioned” it cannot fall into the realm of the knowable.
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Searching for an “unconditioned” structure of reflection leads towards nonperplexing insight, referring to transcendental reflection, that enables every possible
objective act of reflection: “We may therefore say that logical reflection is a mere act of
comparison; for since we take no account whatsoever of the faculty of knowledge to
which the given representations belong, the representations must be treated as being, so
far as their place in the mind is concerned, all of the same order. Transcendental
reflection, on the other hand, since it bears on the objects themselves, contains the ground
of the possibility of the objective comparison of representations with each other, and is
therefore altogether different from the former type of reflection” (Kant, 1787, 1973a,
B318-319). Transcendental reflection is an intrinsically unitary complex structure, which
builds up our transcendental knowledge (Kant, 1787, 1973a, B25). The subject matter of
transcendental knowledge is the human mode of knowing objects a priori, i.e., relating to
concepts that determine objects.
Kant’s absolute introspection ends up with nothing more than “the simple
representation ‘I’ that is in itself entirely empty of content, and of which one cannot even
say that it is a concept. It is merely a consciousness that accompanies all concepts” (Kant,
1787, 1973a, B404). Understanding is not purely a matter of the timeless calculus of
combination and judgment, but rather is possible because of a feeling or intuition.
According to Kant’s theory, we shall not abandon all mention of transcendental
conditions, but we can approach them negatively, by showing, from within, how they
condition and delimit the realm where predicates operate. Through reflection knowledge
is always exposed in a particular form or structure. Reflection leads towards
subjectivization of the universal experience and knowledge into unique and singular
forms of the self and later to self-consciousness. It is inescapably and intrinsically
anchored in time and space, grounded on science as well as the subjective conditions of
every human being. The self that is presented by reflection is purely noumenal – it is the
extensionless point of freedom.
In his analysis of “reflective judgment” Kant asserted that the human mind seeks
to find unknown universals for given particulars rather than to apply given particulars to
universals, because only the particular experience is given, so that the universal must be
found. Human transcendental concepts of nature must be furnished by pure a priori
understanding, which “touch[es] the general possibility of nature” (Kant, 1790, 1973b,
p. 13). Kant indicated that every “determinant judgment” must be under “universal
transcendental laws”, so that nature is adapted to human cognitive needs, being
dependent on our active projection of the unity of nature. “The reflective judgment,
which is compelled to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal, stands,
therefore, in need of a principle. This principle it cannot borrow from experience, because
what it has to do is to establish just the unity of all empirical principles under higher,
though likewise empirical, principles, and thence the possibility of the systematic
subordination of higher and lower. In such a transcendental principle, therefore, the
reflective judgment can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from any
other quarter (as it would then be a determinant judgment). Nor can it prescribe it to
nature, for reflection on the laws of nature adjusts itself to nature, and not nature to the
conditions according to which we strive to obtain a concept of it - a concept that is quite
contingent in respect of these conditions” (Kant, 1790, 1973b, p. 14).
https://openriver.winona.edu/eie/vol6/iss1/3
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In Kantian theory, reflective judgment is an expression of human autonomy and
evidence that nature is adapted to human cognitive needs in a contingent as well as in a
reasonable form. Reflective judgment helps us to apprehend our forms in imagination and
enables free play between imagination and understanding. The apprehension of forms in
“the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgment, even when it has
no intention of so doing, comparing them at least with its faculty of referring intuitions to
concepts” (Kant, 1790, 1973b, p. 26). Kant contended that all human beings possess free
play between imagination and understanding, which could sometimes be a response to
the object itself and at other times could transcend concepts. Reflective judgments
involve the attainment of an aim, sustaining the laws of freedom, and causing us pleasure
in feeling a harmonious relationship. Even the definition of pleasure in Kantian aesthetic
theory is “nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into
play in the reflective judgment” (Kant, 1790, 1973b, p. 30).
Even if the subject could remain immature, irresponsible and dependent on others,
he is still “self-imposed,” which means he is responsible for his own immature condition
and for being an unfree, autonomous person. The subject can blame only himself for his
deeds and thoughts, either if he becomes an autonomous being, i.e., reaching his highest
telos, or if he remains merely heteronomous, i.e., remaining an unfree, dependent person.
Mostly, the subject is insecure in his command of man’s feelings, including his feelings
towards authority, which make him unable to overcome his ignorance of the sources of
his command. Being an autonomous subject means becoming an enlightened individual,
one who acts rationally and thereby, by his acts of freedom, maximizes the quantity of
freedom in the world. The unenlightened self is without reflection, without inner
perception or self-apprehension, in a primary mode, before all reflections and before
projecting any reflectional method.
Kant’s enlightened reality would be reached through his reflectional system that
would transform heteronomous reality into an autonomous one, so that it would be
recognizable to those of us living in unenlightened reality. Such an enlightened reality
would be an ideal stage, where through reaching a reflective autonomous individuality,
the world would be one of free individuals who respect and promote not only their own
freedom but that of others as well; it would be a radically different world. It was Kant’s
highest moral imperative to recognize, to strive for and to reach the goal of
enlightenment, a goal that should guide all human actions.
Following Kant’s absolute introspection we would not find any “complete world”
waiting for us to be “known,” but rather the subject, rift with contradictions, inconsistent
truths, coexisting and bound within finite circumstances. Through reflection the subject
presents and after that represents himself as “I think”, “I will”, “I judge”, “I show.”
Reflection in this sense is self-apprehension, i.e., the way in which the self is unveiled to
itself. The representation of the subject and its determinations must be remembered in
order to be known. Without a concept of the identity of the cognitive subject, the
structure of experience cannot be analyzed (Strawson, 1966, p. 117). The subject of
experience can be regarded as an item in experience and not only a logical device, and at
the same time it is an absolutely unconditioned, necessary entity and thus not a
conditioned object of experience. Reflection is the mechanism through which two sets of
abilities need to be brought together: the capacity of self-ascription of experiences and
the capacity to grasp the objectivity of the world.
Published by OpenRiver, 2003
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If the subject is a conditioned empirical entity, then every impulse or feeling will
change its essence. The identity of the subject exposes itself in the experience, as well as
through the different phases of memory. Having a consistent memory is a fundamental
condition of the subject, which is a rational entity. Rationality can systematically
remember what it has learned, which basically is similar to one of the major aspects of
the nature of identity. While a non-rational being is directly identical to whatever state it
is in, a rational one knows it has moved and is able to apply predicates like “truth” by
virtue of that cognizance and that cognizance only. Being a rational person involves the
systematic reflective capacity to find out, with respect to any belief, whether or not it is
being held on good grounds. The subject is the original ground of the unity of the
manifold representations and what is represented has been reached through reflections’
processes, which must be thought with them. Reflection is not simply apprehension of
what is thought and represented, rather presents the thinking subject along with it.
Hegel’s subject is entrenched on alienation of natural Being and individual rising to
universality; thus he correspondingly understands the person as “self.” Reaching
subjectivity means the definiteness of the universal (Hegel, 1967). The subject exhibits
itself as an active entity, in its internal activity or processuality, i.e., the subject becomes
an “inter-subjective” activity that develops in culture, history and science. The selfeducating subjectivity becomes the highest universality, concrete Being of the universal,
an individualization of its content. It is the role of reflective education to guide a subject
towards universal experience and knowledge, while any subject is never born, as he has
to be. Through reflection, subjectivization of the universal experience and knowledge
reach unique and singular forms of the self and self-consciousness.
Through reflective logic, the foundation of reason reveals itself to be rooted in
dialogical and inter-subjective knowledge. Reason represents the central unifying point
for universal thought and only reason can lead to absolute certainty. Although the concept
of rational autonomy is implied by the belief in universal reason, there is a need for a
teleological theory, which should explain how universal reason leads precisely to rational
autonomy (Cassirer, 1955, p. 5). According to Hegel’s definition, reason is reality, and
that alone is truly real which is reasonable. The self-realization of reason is fulfilled
through the process of recognition of reason, by which is meant the unity of thinking and
being. Hegel’s process of argumentation leads to the conclusion that dialogue is the most
fundamental form of rational activity, because only through it can the “empty subject”
learn that there are boundaries and that it itself is constituted by its ability to cross them.
Hegel’s “master-slave dialectic” illuminates the basic striving deeds of consciousness in
order to reach rational autonomy (Hegel, 1967, pp. 228-40).
Hegel’s “master-slave dialectic” reveals that self-consciousness could not exist
without the mutual recognition of, and by, another self-conscious being, because neither
could exist without the other, yet they must both already exist in order for the recognition
to take place. Asserting that self-consciousness is attained through the recognition of, and
by, another person does not mean that the other could not still be the self (Pippin, 1989).
Reflection is regarded by Hegel as an elevation of thinking to the position of speculation,
i.e., as a destruction of structures. Hegel used reflection as a synonym for understanding
and when it moved within its limits, then it is regarded as finite. It is the telos of
speculative logic to carry out a destructive process, which will guarantee a reasonable
insight into the basic structure of reality. The need of human consciousness to integrate
all aspects of reality into its understanding of the world, as a coherent unity, is reached
through a dialectic process of reflection.

https://openriver.winona.edu/eie/vol6/iss1/3

8

Idalovichi: Grounds and Perspectives of Critical Reflection - An Educational and Philosophical Inquiry

A reflective self is a self-determined person who refers willingly to himself, and
he thinks of freedom as a case of self-reference. By using the power of reflection, it is
possible to understand that if a person is to see his own reflection in a mirror, or any other
reflective surface, then as long as the self does not recognize the reflection as an image of
its own self, this reflection acts as the necessary other while in reality still being the self.
This dialectic is centered on the issue of recognition that the “subject” needs dialogue
because only in a contest of this sort can it wrest knowledge from opinion. If I do not try
out my assertions on someone else and win, I will have no certainty or in Hegelian terms
I will feel fully autonomous and human only to the extent that someone I recognize as
autonomous and human recognizes me.
Rational subjects need each other not as objects of desire or exploitation, but as a
test for truth. Without differences of opinion, there can be no knowledge. Rational
subjects “know themselves” by crossing the boundary of what they know, and they can
only know anything at all as a result of the inter-subjective dialectic or dialogue they
conduct. Reflection of a rational subject is the knowledge that the mind has of itself and
its operations (Habermas, 1992).
Every rational being gains self-awareness by “negating” itself in the sense that it
posits itself as an object, removing itself from the immediacy of being solely the knowing
subject. Thus, a splitting or reduplication of self occurs: The person is still there as a
subject, even though positing himself as an object. Representing a subject as an object,
and later the object as a system, means that the reflection of the subject and the object
through a discrete and finite set of elements and relations creates a new reality. The
subject who becomes an object of the real world possesses an infinite complexity and an
infinite diversity of its properties. A task of the reflection is to overcome such
contradictions and to single out from the infinite complexity of a subject, who becomes
an object, such a formation that gives knowledge about it with attributes of explanation
and forecast.
The subject interprets and decodes profound meanings that stand for obvious,
superficial ones. This activity of reflection is a part of the process of accumulation of
knowledge. The internal spiritual world of the subject is the world of ideas and images,
which cannot be excluded from the sense-giving and sense-conceiving activity of the
subject himself. One thus needs to transform oneself to gain access to the truth and
meanings in the interpreting activity. The derivative of such reflection is selfconsciousness. By negating its own immediacy, “consciousness comes to know itself” as
others know it (Hegel, 1967, pp. 228-40). Taking leave of his own egocentricity, an
individual sees himself as one subject among others, and so should his special
subjectivity be regarded. Self-consciousness reached through a reflective process is not
only of the subject itself, but also of reasoning-related capabilities and limitations of
human beings in general.
It is a fallacy, however, to view reflection as an “instrument” or as a
“prescription” leading towards an assertion about “reality,” “the world,” “the truth” or
“the laws of thought.” Reflection is gazing, armed with something akin to common-sense
realism - some knowledge about the world and the self in it. This simple description of
“reality” or “the world” is not the same as the activity we call “describing” – for it fails to
encompass the manner in which the description and the world interact as parts of the
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same process. In common-sense realism, increasing knowledge consists of one’s
description of what it is. Hegel wanted to put an end to the philosophy of subjective
certainty through a reflective process, which should lead towards a suitable interpretation
of self-consciousness phenomenon. Acts of reflection enable the subject to isolate its own
states and activities thematically and to bring them to explicit consciousness. Reflection
itself does not motivate or define the self-consciousness: it is a subject which has the
character of reflective acts, acts of self-reference which remain oriented towards the
subject.
Husserl’s phenomenology aims to go back to both the formal or a priori epistemic
knowledge and the material presupposition of knowledge and thus to constitute the whole
reality and everything in it. His term for phenomenological reflection affirms “that under
the concept of reflexion must be included all modes of immanent apprehension of the
essence, and on the other hand, all modes of immanent experience (Erfahrung)” (Husserl,
1973, p. 219). Knowledge grows discontinuously and through a series of confrontations
with reality, including the unfamiliar and the other. Thus, appropriation of knowledge,
internalization of the memory of our collective subjects, emerges out of following the
process of construction. Being an intersubjective entity means that knowledge is no
longer a result or a “discovery,” rather is constructed. Reflection can be projected onto
knowledge because all knowledge progresses through construction rather than discovery.
Its universal methodological function is essential only if we use the phenomenological
method, because, as Husserl points out, “phenomenological methods proceed entirely
through acts of reflection” (Husserl, 1973, p. 215). In the phenomenological system,
every variety of reflection has the character of a modification of consciousness and the
different degrees of consciousness are dependent on the different degrees of reflections.
“…Every variety of ‘reflexion’ has the character of a modification of consciousness, and
indeed of such a modification as every consciousness can, in principle, experience”
(Husserl, 1973, p. 219).
Husserl’s concept of reflection, in a wide sense, refers not only to the
apprehensions of acts, but to every retrospection or turning away from the natural
direction of viewing to the object. “Reflexion…is an expression for acts in which the
stream of experience (Erlebnis), with all its manifold events (phases of experience,
internationalities) can be grasped and analyzed in the light of its own evidence. It is…the
name we give to consciousness’ own method for the knowledge of consciousness
generally” (Husserl, 1973, p. 219). In constitutive phenomenology the various levels of
objectivity are traced from the level of sensibility to that of the ideal objectivities of
understanding. The natural world in which we make our start is one where independent
existence is taken for granted naively. Therefore, there is a distinction between “natural”
or “naïve” reflection and “pure reflection,” which is related to the performance of
phenomenological reduction. The pure sphere of transcendental subjectivity can only be
attained by means of phenomenological attitude, i.e., pure reflection, which requires the
performance of an “epoché” (Husserl, 1973, pp. 107-116).
“Only through acts of experiencing as reflected on do we know anything of the
stream of experience and of its necessary relationship to the pure Ego” (Husserl, 1973,
p. 222). The ego of natural reflection reflects upon man within the limits of the natural
attitude, while in the process of transcendental reflection that ego is eliminated and is
replaced by an “outside” ego as reflecting agent. This process towards transcendental
intersubjectivity, based on the self-consciousness, includes in itself the whole processes
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and metamorphoses of the subject. The indubitable data of self-consciousness, reached
through pure reflection, is regarded as an act of experience or as its correlate, that which
is thought. The distinction between natural reflection and pure reflection, which evolves
in transcendental reflection, indicates the leading stages of the investigation, such as
identification of intentional nature of experience, its basic characteristics, the element of
time and the performance of the reflection itself. Husserl’s three subjects or egos are
dependent on the different degrees of reflection: first, the world-immersed ego; second,
the transcendental ego; and third, the ego epoché-performing observer.
Husserl’s process of reflection having been outlined consciousness as a “way in”
(internal) can turn itself to a “way out,” i.e., to the constitutive problem of truth and
reality. Truth and reality have a meaning for us because the structure of consciousness
indicates the method of proceeding in which reflection is a vital component of it.
Transcendental reflection asserts that all adequate evidence of reality is due to a synthesis
that belongs to us, and it is in us that reality has its transcendental foundation. Husserl
regards transcendental intersubjectivity as the ultimate concrete ground of all
transcendent reflections and their constituted transcendent consciousness. All objective
existence is established according to transcendental laws, and consequently, the aim of
phenomenology is to achieve absolute knowledge of the world and the ultimate ground of
its being.
Speaking and writing are reflexive activities that instill their own point of
generation within themselves as perspectives, points of view or persons. Written or
spoken subjectivity is located within the discourse as the subject of discourse. The point
of view from which the reflection of experience is carried out is not identical to the
subject of the experience. Between the reflecting subject and the subject reflected on
there is neither a simple identification nor a simple disparity of perspectives, but rather
complex and complicit relationships. Otherwise, the reflection would be circular: the
reflection, as an activity performed by the subject, could become aware of its own results
only after the processes become a fact. By reflecting on certain states of affairs, the
subject does not bring it to consciousness for the first time, while this activity is directed
towards some end. Considering the subject as content in reflective phenomenological
analysis makes possible the appearance of an object of reflection. The subject is no
longer grasped as an object of intuitive presentation, but as an object of
phenomenological reflection. To this end reflection should reach certain knowledge of
the subject itself and it should be able to describe itself. By reaching this end, the subject
will be able to assert its certainty and its self-acquaintance results from the reflection.
The reflection’s process can help us to become aware to the predisposing
constituents of human understanding, by reorienting and reorganizing our predispositions and qualities. It presumes that it is possible to ascribe any predicate of the
subject and to distinguish anything from itself that is different from it. Self-referred
knowledge of the subject is possible only through reflective acts, although it seems to be
a circular model, because it started from the subject and it reaches the subject during the
reflection’s act and at the end. The “subject” is the same subject before reaching
reflective knowledge and after it. However, it does not imply that this attained human
knowledge and understanding is far from being ultimately capable of rational autonomy
or that an enlightened and rational being secured the foundations of the certainty of truth.
The knowing self-reference which is present in reflection is an explication, which isolates
the basic facts. In Hegelian terminology reflection is a constant process of “coming-to-
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itself.” The subject grasps his own organizing function and is capable of interpreting
himself through reflection as well as through his actions controlled by reflection.
Reflection is not a singular process or state of mind: it can be a set of reflections,
which evoke maximum personal freedom, by being anchored in the power of imagination
(Fichte, 1962, I, pp. 220-1). In this set of reflections possible thoughts are reflected
themselves, so that the power of imagination masters the whole process. The reflection
reaches a new “object” and a new meaning at every stage, while this object becomes the
“new” subject, with a new perspective, understanding and comprehension of itself and its
reality. In this set of reflections, some of them reach conscious products and some of
them unconscious products, which means that the subject sometimes reaches conscious
and sometimes unconscious reality. Reflection is an act of freedom, and the power of
imagination exalts and praises this freedom. The power of imagination enables the
reflection to be a constitutive activity of the subject and unifies the objects of reflection
through its synthesis.
Yet, the power of imagination does not lead reflections in any fixed direction.
Even after critical reflection the subject may be unable to see the significance of the
evidence that he possesses. Moreover, such evidence may be locked away in memory that
the subject is unable to recall, even after prolonged critical reflection. Critical reflection
may be unsuccessful because the subject fails to properly take account of evidence he
possesses, evidence that disrupts the justification of the belief being reflected upon.
Therefore, only by being blocked, knocking or reaching the other, is the reflection
determined and a dialogical orientation reached. Reflection is a dialogical method of
defining the reality by the reflecting subject, while this reality is in its turn the new base
of a new reflected reality. The critical ingredient in the connection between selfconsciousness and the capacity for objective thought is to be found in the connection
between the capacity to represent oneself through a reflective process as one embodied
entity among others and the objective representation. Then there is no ultimate or
determinate reality or subject, but only directed, reflexive activity of the subject and his
objective representation of it.
In keeping with Hegel’s idea that every philosophy that distinguishes between
thought and Being through the subjectivity of the thinking process, as it experiences the
objects, is a philosophy of reflection, we assume that most learning processes and
relationships between students and teachers are grounded on the possibility of dialogic
reflections – epitomized or perhaps set in motion by the “Who says?!” phenomenon. The
dialogic reflection should not be imagined as going ad infinitum, tediously sifting
through every imaginable case to produce a counter-example: It is simply an
ascertainment of what the interlocutors are, in their present state of knowledge, prepared
to agree upon. Dialogical acquisition is, therefore, matters of determining what you and I
may thenceforth possibly know (Lorenzen & Lorenz, 1978).
The subject of education is a self-consciously autonomous free individual,
existing in immediate reflective relations within a finite world, directly known as his
own. It is the same subject who incessantly interprets, decodes profound meanings that
stand behind the common, the superficial or the mythical. This activity of thinking in
education is no less important than the accumulation of knowledge. The subject of
education is the sense-giving and sense-conceiving activity of himself through the
process of reflection. Therefore, the reflective subject needs to transform his self to gain
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access to the truth and meanings in the interpreting activity. Reflection can help us to
become aware of predisposing constituents of human understanding. However,
interpretative preconceptions always remain in play and reflection cannot get rid of them
in the name of autonomous reason, or certainty, or any all-encompassing overview.
Reflection is used in all areas of discourse. There are obviously other approaches
to the philosophy of education than critical reflection. Nonetheless, a metacritique of the
epistemology of learning requires a constructive and later a critical reflection upon its
structure, a process which will basically secure its fundament. Reflection and reflective
education have a crucial role in democratic society and civic education, precisely because
of the fact that we don’t believe in absolute or supernatural philosophy, in which thought
and Being are one, or the One is the source of our thoughts and reality as well. Every
autonomous human being should adopt a reflective attitude towards his own historical
period, his society, his culture and his system of education as well as towards their
interpretations. Reflective thinking should transform into a critical strategy and later into
a tool of interpretation of economical-social-political reality. The reflective process
involved in every domain of human reality must in turn be examined, because all
reflection occurs in a cultural-historical setting. Yet, there is no endless regress, because
the requirements of an objective analysis are met when the reflecting observer is
considered in his relationship to his field of inquiry. Further stages of reflection would
yield nothing more. The project of critical reflection should be completed to the limits of
what is possible at least.
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